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The main theorem of Yoram Halevy (2008, Theorem 1, p. 1150) states that 
a rank-dependent expected utility maximizer exhibits diminishing impatience 
(i.e., quasi-hyperbolic discounting) if and only if the elasticity of the probability 
weighting function of the decision maker is increasing. An implication of such a 
result is the equivalence between diminishing impatience and the common ratio 
effect (CRE).
Claim 1 of this comment shows that the “only if ” part of Theorem 1 in Halevy 
(2008) is false. One might wonder whether, even though the theorem is false, the 
main implication relating diminishing impatience with the CRE is true. Claim 2 
shows that diminishing impatience does not imply the CRE.
Given the correction, two natural questions arise when considering a joint 
model, such as Halevy’s (2008), that relates decision making under risk and 
intertemporal decision making: (i) “Is there a behavioral property in deci-
sion making under risk that is equivalent to diminishing impatience?”; (ii) “Is 
there a behavioral property of intertemporal decision making that is equiva-
lent to the CRE?” Claim 3 answers these questions: it shows that dimin-
ishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect (CE) and that strong 
diminishing impatience (i.e., hyperbolic discounting) is equivalent to 
the CRE.
An implication of Claim 3 is that under any additional assumptions which 
would make the “only if ” part of Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) true, diminishing 
impatience becomes equivalent to strong diminishing impatience, and, similarly, 
the CRE also becomes equivalent to the CE. Thus, whatever assumption is added 
to make the “only if ” part of Theorem 1 true, it must confound the conceptually 
clear and empirically robust distinction between quasi-hyperbolic discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting on the one hand, and also between the CRE and the CE on 
the other hand.
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To provide Claim 1, we review the setup used by Halevy (2008). He characterizes 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting in terms of diminishing impatience:
(1)  ∀ t ∈  ℤ +  , t ≥ 1 :  D(0) _D(1)  >  
D(t) _ 
D(t + 1) ,
where D(⋅) is a discount function. Also, he characterizes hyperbolic discounting in 
terms of strong diminishing impatience:
(2)  ∀ t ∈  ℤ +  :  D(t) _ D(t + 1) >  
D(t + 1) _
D(t + 2)  ,
or, equivalently, ∀ t ∈  ℤ +  , ∀ s ∈  ℤ + + : D(t)/D(t + 1) > D(t + s)/D(t + s + 1). 
He studies a rank-dependent expected utility decision maker for whom
(3)  D(t) =  β t g((1 − r ) t ),
where β is a pure time-discount factor, g is a rank-dependent probability-weighting 
function, and r is a constant hazard probability per period.
Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) is equivalent to the statement that D exhibits dimin-
ishing impatience if and only if the elasticity  ε g ( p) ≡ g′(p)p/g( p) of g is increasing. 
Claim 1 shows that the “only if ” part of this theorem is false (although it should 
be noted that this error essentially originates in Uzi Segal (1987a, Lemma 4.1), on 
which the “only if ” part of Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) crucially depends).
CLAIM 1: suppose that
(4)  g( p) =   √ 
_ p  _  ( √ _ p +  √ _ 1 − p )2 .
Then D(t) exhibits diminishing impatience while g has decreasing elasticity in a 
neighborhood of p = 0.
PROOF:
First, we will show that D exhibits diminishing impatience. As Halevy (2008, 
p. 1150) shows in Theorem 1, diminishing impatience is equivalent to g( pq) > 
g( p) g(q) for all p, q ∈ (0, 1). That this inequality holds for g as defined by (4) fol-
lows from a straightforward calculation: simple algebra yields that this inequality 
holds if and only if for all p, q ∈ (0, 1), 
(5)  √ _ p(1 − p) +  √ _ q(1 − q) + 2 √ __  pq(1 − p)(1 − q) >  √ _  pq(1 − pq) ,
which is true because 2 √ __  (1 − p)(1 − q) >  √ _ (1 − pq)  for all p, q ∈ (0, 1).
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Next, we will show g has decreasing elasticity in a neighborhood of p = 0. This 
is also by a direct calculation. With some manipulation, the derivative is written as 
follows:
(6)  ε′g( p) = −  1 − 2p − 2 √ 
_
 (1 − p)p
   __    
2( √ _ 1 − p +  √ _ p)2 (1 − p)3/2  √ _ p ,
which one can immediately see is continuous and converges to − ∞ as p → 0. There-
fore,  ε g ′ ( p) is negative in a neighborhood of zero. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Given Claim 1, Claim 2 shows that diminishing impatience does not imply the 
CRE. To provide Claim 2, we review the definition of the CRE. Denote by (x, l), 
a lottery which gives a positive prize x ∈ ℝ+ with probability l ∈ [0, 1] and gives 
0 with probability 1 − l. The common ratio effect (CRE) is defined by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979, p. 282) as follows: for all x, y ∈ ℝ+ p, 
q ∈ (0, 1) l ∈ (0, 1],
 if (y, ql) is indifferent to (x, l), then (y, pql) is preferred to (x, pl).
The certainty effect (CE) is defined as a special case of the CRE when l = 1.
CLAIM 2: Rank-dependent risk preferences characterized by g in Claim 1 together 
with a continuous and strictly increasing utility function u satisfying u(0) = 0 do 
not exhibit the common ratio effect (CRE).
PROOF:
This would follow from Claim 1 and Halevy’s (2008) claim that Segal (1987b) 
proves that increasing elasticity holds if and only if the CRE holds. However, Segal 
(1987b) proves only that increasing elasticity implies the CRE. We show the converse 
here. Since we showed that the elasticity is decreasing in a neighborhood of 0, there 
exist  p * ,  q * such that 0 <  p * <  q * and  ε g (  p * ) >  ε g ( q * ). By defining α =  q * / p * > 1, 
g(α  p * )g′(  p * ) > αg′(α  p * )g(  p * ), so that 
(7)   d (g (αp)/g ( p))  __
dp
  | p= p *  =  αg′ (α  p * ) g (  p * ) − g (α  p * ) g′ (  p * )___(g (  p * ))2  < 0. 
This is true for any p in the region where the elasticity is decreasing. Hence, 
by the continuity of g, there exist p′ and q′ in the region where the elasticity is 
decreasing such that p′ < q′, α q′ < 1, and g(α p′ )/g(p′ ) > g(α q′ )/g(q′ ). Since u 
is strictly increasing and u(0) = 0, then  lim x→0 u(x)/u(y) = 0 < g(α p′ )/g(α q′ ) < 1 = u(y)/u(y) for all y > 0. Therefore, by the continuity of u, there exist prizes 
x and y such that
(8)   g(α p′ ) _
g(α q′ )  =  
u(x) _
u(y)  >  
g(p′ ) _
g(q′ )  .
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This implies that g(α q′ )u(x ) = g(α p′ )u(y ) but g(q′ )u(x ) > g(p′ )u(y ). Since α > 1, 
this violates the CRE and completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claims 1 and 2 imply that only a partial result of Halevy (2008) is true in general: 
the CRE implies diminishing impatience. Claim 3 shows the complete relationships 
as follows:
CLAIM 3: suppose that D is defined by (3).
 (i) Diminishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect (CE),
 (ii) strong diminishing impatience is equivalent to the common ratio effect (CRE).
PROOF:
For the rank-dependent utility maximizer, the CE is as follows: for all prizes x, y 
and p, q ∈ (0, 1), if u(x) = g(q)u(y) then g( p)u(x) < g( pq)u(y). Equivalently, for 
all p, q ∈ (0, 1), g( p)g(q) < g( pq). Therefore,
(9)   Diminishing Impatience
 ⇔ ∀ t ∈  ℤ +  , ∀ r ∈ (0, 1) [g((1 − r ) t+1 ) > g(1 − r)g((1 − r ) t )]
 ⇔ ∀ p, q ∈ (0, 1) [g( pq) > g( p)g(q)]
 ⇔ Certainty Effect,
where the first and the second equivalence are by Theorem 1 of Halevy (2008, p. 
1150).
Similarly, the CRE is as follows: for all prizes x, y and p, q ∈ (0, 1), l ∈ (0, 1], if 
g(l)u(x) = g(ql)u(y) then g( pl)u(x) < g( pql)u(y). Equivalently, for all p, q ∈ (0, 1), 
l ∈ (0, 1], g( pl)g(ql) < g(l)g( pql). Therefore,
(10)  Strong Diminishing Impatience
 ⇔ ∀ t ∈  ℤ +  , ∀ s ∈  ℤ ++  , ∀ r ∈ (0, 1) [g((1 − r ) t )g((1 − r ) t+s+1 )
 > g((1 − r ) t+1 )g((1 − r ) t+s )]
 ⇔ ∀ p, q ∈ (0, 1), ∀ l ∈ (0, 1] [g(l)g( pql) > g( pl)g(ql)]
 ⇔ Common Ratio Effect.
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
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There are assumptions, such as monotonicity of  ε g ( p) or convexity of g, under 
which the “only if ” part of Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) is true, so that diminishing 
impatience becomes equivalent to the CRE. As noted earlier, Claim 3 shows that any 
such assumption must confound the distinction between quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing and hyperbolic discounting, and also between the CRE and the CE.
Claim 3 is a special case of the results in Saito (2009) which shows these rela-
tionships without assuming specific form of utility function and hazard probability 
function.
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